I was in New York City last week to be filmed for a segment on Katie Couric's ABC show airing today (Monday Feb. 11). The show features Katie's interview with Sue Paterno, the widow of former Penn State coach Joe Paterno. I appear towards the end of the show to provide legal commentary.
For more information about the show and local listings, click here. Hope you can watch today. Here's an excerpt:
Katie Couric Show on Sue Paterno and Penn State
Sunday, 10 February 2013
University of Chicago Sports Symposium (Business and Law) on February 15th
On Friday, February 15th, please join me for the third-annual MESG Sports Symposium at the Gleacher Center, brought to you by the Chicago Booth Media, Entertainment and Sports Group and the University of Chicago School of Law. The day will include three panel discussions, a keynote speaker, a networking lunch, and post-event networking reception. I am participating on the law panel that will focus on labor negotiations.For information on ordering tickets, click here (or here if you are a student). There will be several networking opportunities and panels will include:
9:45 am - 10:45am: Sports Marketing at Scale: Making the most of your sponsorship dollars. Moderated by Scott Meadow, Clinical Professor of Entrepreneurship
- Corey Christanell, Director of Sports Marketing, Anheuser Busch
- Michael O'Conor, Partner Marketing Division, Retail & Services, US Olympic Committee
- Diana Juhasz, Senior Manager, Corporate Partnerships, Discover Financial Services
- John Shumate, Manager, Brand Management & Strategy, Gatorade
10:45am - 11:15am: Fireside Chat: Inside Olympic Marketing with Corey Christanell, Director of Sports Marketing, Anheuser Busch and Michael O'Conor, Partner Marketing Division, Retail & Services, US Olympic Committee
12:15pm - 1:15pm: Whose Lockout is it Anyway? The evolving role of collective bargaining agreements & labor negotiations in professional sports.
- Professor Michael LeRoy, Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago Law School
- Timothy Liam Epstein, Partner, SmithAmundsen
- Mike McCartney, Director of Football Operations, Priority Sports & Entertainment
- Scott Gaffield, Octagon 1:15pm - 2:00pm:
Fireside Chat: Behind the BTN Big 10K, Erin Harvego, Vice President of Marketing, Big Ten Network 2:15pm - 3:15pm:
From the Classroom to the Playing Field: How analytics have revolutionized the world of Sports. Moderated by John Huizinga, Walter David "Bud" Fackler Distinguished Service Professor of Economics, Chicago Booth
- Vince Gennaro ('77), President, Society for American Baseball Research (SABR)
- Ken Kovash ('06), Director of Football Research & Player Personnel Assistant, Cleveland Browns
- Bob Meyerhoff, President, Information Logistics
Closing Remarks: Tobias Moskowitz, Fama Family Professor of Finance, Chicago Booth
Time to Modify NLIs
Wednesday, 6 February 2013
Today (February 6th) is the National Signing Day for college football, and all across America high school seniors are formally declaring their intentions to attend specific universities. As part of the tradition, fax machines in football offices are humming as student-athletes submit their National Letters of Intent (NLIs) binding them to their chosen institution. [Here's a link to the 2013-14 NLI.]
In theory, the purpose of the NLIs was to indicate to other schools that the high school student was formally ending the recruiting process, thereby notifying other institutions to cease all efforts to convince him to play football for their program. As we’ve seen repeatedly, this is not necessarily the case anymore.
What is most disconcerting about this process is the fact that many of these recruits are signing these contracts, with the help of their parents if they are not 18, based on a particular coach not the university. However, the NLI is clear that this is not of import. Specifically, paragraph 11 of the 2013-13 NLI states:
11. Coaching Changes:
I understand I have signed this NLI with the institution and not for a particular sport or coach. If a coach leaves the institution or the sports program (e.g., not retained, resigns), I remain bound by the provisions of this NLI. I understand it is not uncommon for a coach to leave his or her coaching position.
However, they are basing their decision on the promises of college football coaches who, surprisingly, have a propensity to stretch the truth if it serves their purposes. Thus, when a coach says “I promise you I’m staying at State University” and then proceeds to accept another job that they perceive to be a step forward in their career, the student is left committed to the institution not the coach. This announcement from a coach could happen while the ink is still wet on the contract.
Unequivocally, each person has a right to pursue any opportunities that they feel benefit their career and their families, but why should the student-athlete not have some recourse if they’ve been misled?
Friend and fellow student-athlete advocate Marc Isenberg (Money Players) doesn't mince words when he wrote this piece entitled "The NLI SUCKS!"
Friend and fellow student-athlete advocate Marc Isenberg (Money Players) doesn't mince words when he wrote this piece entitled "The NLI SUCKS!"
I’d recommend, at an absolute minimum, there be an addendum that reads, in part:
“If there is a coaching change that occurs within one calendar year of the execution of this contract, paragraph 11 is no longer valid, and, so long as I’m in good academic standing, I have the ability to transfer to another institution without losing a year of collegiate eligibility.”
Obscure rules, limiting rules, and the Super Bowl
Tuesday, 5 February 2013
Two items following on my post on the rules discussions following the Super Bowl:
First, here is a nice discussion of the fair-catch kick rule that the Niners might have tried to execute to tie the game had the Ravens punter shanked the kick. The author describes the rule as vestigial, a throwback to rugby's "try from mark" rule, which rugby subsequently eliminated, as did college football. But arguably the rule remains necessary to maintain a more even balance of costs and benefits on an intentional safety, by giving the trailing team another weapon with which it can counter the benefits the leading team gets from the intentional safety.
Second, a commenter to my prior post raises the situation that may have occurred in last year's Super Bowl: The offense needs a touchdown to win or tie while the the defense wants to stop the touchdown and run time off the clock, so the defense puts extra players on the field. The extra players obviously give the defense a better chance of stopping the offense on the play. And while the defense will surrender five yards and the down will be replayed on the penalty, time has run off the clock on the live play, meaning the offense will get fewer plays to run.
This seems to meet the three features that necessitate a limiting rule: The defense has an incentive to do something we ordinarily don't expect; the defense is in control and the offense cannot counter (because trying to score against 12 or 14 is going to be exceedingly difficult); and the cost-benefit disparity has increased dramatically, because the offense is going to run out of clock on wasted plays.
And recognizing this, the NFL enacted a limiting rule: If the defense has 12 men on the field and the extra players are not attempting to get off the field, the play is whistled dead on the snap and the clock stops (if the defender is trying to get off the field, the play is live, since the extra defender does not hinder the offense). This eliminates the advantage to the defense--it cannot use extra defenders to stop a play and cause the offense to waste time because the clock stops--in turn eliminating the negative incentive for the defense.
First, here is a nice discussion of the fair-catch kick rule that the Niners might have tried to execute to tie the game had the Ravens punter shanked the kick. The author describes the rule as vestigial, a throwback to rugby's "try from mark" rule, which rugby subsequently eliminated, as did college football. But arguably the rule remains necessary to maintain a more even balance of costs and benefits on an intentional safety, by giving the trailing team another weapon with which it can counter the benefits the leading team gets from the intentional safety.
Second, a commenter to my prior post raises the situation that may have occurred in last year's Super Bowl: The offense needs a touchdown to win or tie while the the defense wants to stop the touchdown and run time off the clock, so the defense puts extra players on the field. The extra players obviously give the defense a better chance of stopping the offense on the play. And while the defense will surrender five yards and the down will be replayed on the penalty, time has run off the clock on the live play, meaning the offense will get fewer plays to run.
This seems to meet the three features that necessitate a limiting rule: The defense has an incentive to do something we ordinarily don't expect; the defense is in control and the offense cannot counter (because trying to score against 12 or 14 is going to be exceedingly difficult); and the cost-benefit disparity has increased dramatically, because the offense is going to run out of clock on wasted plays.
And recognizing this, the NFL enacted a limiting rule: If the defense has 12 men on the field and the extra players are not attempting to get off the field, the play is whistled dead on the snap and the clock stops (if the defender is trying to get off the field, the play is live, since the extra defender does not hinder the offense). This eliminates the advantage to the defense--it cannot use extra defenders to stop a play and cause the offense to waste time because the clock stops--in turn eliminating the negative incentive for the defense.
Sports Lawyers Association -- Networking Event in Boston
Monday, 4 February 2013
O’Bannon & The Future of the NCAA
Monday, February 11, 2013
6:00 pm: CLE Program
7:00 pm: Networking Reception
In July 2009, attorneys for former UCLA basketball star Ed O’Bannon filed O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA). The lawsuit raised important questions about the commercialization of college athletics and student-athletes’ rights to publicity and compensation. Meanwhile, in October 2012, the NCAA unveiled a new enforcement structure featuring harsher penalties and increased accountability for rules violations. The changes reflected the NCAA’s renewed commitment to preserving amateurism in college athletics. The conflicting viewpoints underlying the two actions will soon come to a head as O’Bannon winds through the courts. Recent rulings suggest potentially radical changes in college athletics that could redefine amateurism and the role of the NCAA itself.
This program will discuss the evolution of the current environment and what recent developments in O’Bannon might mean for the future of the NCAA. Discussion will touch upon numerous topics, including the mechanics of the new NCAA enforcement structure, the landmark cases that led to O’Bannon, recent rulings in that case and what NCAA enforcement may look like in the near and distant future.
Featured Presenters:
Dennis M. Coleman, Partner, Ropes & Gray; Chair, Ropes & Gray Sports Law Practice Group
Warren K. Zola, Assistant Dean for Graduate Programs & Adjunct Assoc, Professor, Boston College Carroll School of Management; Chair, Boston College Professional Sports Counseling Panel
David W. Mindell, Associate, Ropes & Gray
Ropes & Gray LLP
800 Boylston Street
Boston, MA 02199
Please RSVP to RGEvents@ropesgray.com by Thursday, February 7
Intention Safety = Infield Fly?
Sunday, 3 February 2013
One of the non-baseball plays often suggested to me in discussions of the Infield Fly Rule (and why the Rule is not necessary) is the intentional safety late in the game. Like the infield fly, the argument goes, a team is intentionally not doing what we ordinarily expect it to do--here, running sideways or backwards and intentionally surrendering points. So should this play, which helped clinch Super Bowl XLVII for the Ravens, be banned, just like the dropped infield fly?
Under my model (introduced here and being refined in a current work-in-progress), three features define a sports situation as so out-of-balance as to warrant a special limiting rule: 1) Negative incentives for a team to intentionally not do what we expect under ordinary rules and strategies; 2) total control over the play resting with one team and leaves the other helpless to counter the play; and 3) overwhelming cost-benefit disparity, with substantial benefits in favor of the controlling team and substantial costs imposed on (and absolutely no benefits received by) the opponent. Applying that standard, the intentional safety is not like the infield fly and should not be banned or limited.
One thing to keep in mind about football (distinct from baseball) is that there are several moving parts--teams not only worry about scoring and gaining maximum yardage on a play, but also about field position, sets of downs, and time. So football teams regularly make small cost-benefit trade-offs, intentionally failing to seek maximum yardage on a play in exchange for time off the clock. On the play in question, the Ravens incurred a cost--two points, meaning a field goal could tie the game, and they still have to kick the ball away--in exchange for the benefits of eight seconds off the clock and a more advantageous punting position (twenty yards upfield and no rush). The Niners, in turn, experienced both of those in reverse. The Niners also were not helpless or out of control on the play--although they could not stop the safety, they could have anticipated the play better, brought more pressure, and not allowed as much time to run off the clock (although there was a pretty blatant offensive hold on the play*). The Niners also benefited by getting the ball back (with more than four seconds if they had played it better) and an opportunity to make a counter-play--a run back on the kick, Hail Mary pass, or (as Jim Nantz discussed) the fair-catch kick, had the Ravens punter shanked the free kick. So the second and third features are clearly absent on this play. This looks like just one more example of teams exchanging small costs for small (but, it hopes, slightly greater) benefits.
This calculus would change if the safety occurred on the final play of the game (say, where the play starts with :01 on the clock). The play now contains all three features--there is a far greater cost-benefit imbalance, and the trailing team has no control and will not get the ball back or have the chance to take advantage of the safety. But that does not undermine the intentional safety or require a limiting rule. Any problem there can be remedied by still requiring the team to free kick after the safety, even with no time on the clock, giving the trailing team an opportunity to do something on that play (including the fair-catch-and-free-kick). In other words, treat a safety at the end of the game the same as any other safety. We already some precedent on this. A game cannot end on a defensive penalty. And a team that scores a game-winning touchdown on the final play still must play the point-after, even with no time on the clock.
So another fun example of sports rules in action. Just as last fall's National League Wild Card had everyone talking about the IFR, I am glad this Super Bowl has people talking about the intentional safety. But it further illustrates how just unique the Infield Fly Rule is. and another illustration of what makes the Infield Fly Rule so unique.
* John Hollinger pointed out how smart that hold actually was. If the hold had been called, the result would have been a safety (the typical result of a holding penalty in the end zone), precisely what the Ravens wanted there. Since it wasn't called, it just let the Ravens run more time off the clock.
Under my model (introduced here and being refined in a current work-in-progress), three features define a sports situation as so out-of-balance as to warrant a special limiting rule: 1) Negative incentives for a team to intentionally not do what we expect under ordinary rules and strategies; 2) total control over the play resting with one team and leaves the other helpless to counter the play; and 3) overwhelming cost-benefit disparity, with substantial benefits in favor of the controlling team and substantial costs imposed on (and absolutely no benefits received by) the opponent. Applying that standard, the intentional safety is not like the infield fly and should not be banned or limited.
One thing to keep in mind about football (distinct from baseball) is that there are several moving parts--teams not only worry about scoring and gaining maximum yardage on a play, but also about field position, sets of downs, and time. So football teams regularly make small cost-benefit trade-offs, intentionally failing to seek maximum yardage on a play in exchange for time off the clock. On the play in question, the Ravens incurred a cost--two points, meaning a field goal could tie the game, and they still have to kick the ball away--in exchange for the benefits of eight seconds off the clock and a more advantageous punting position (twenty yards upfield and no rush). The Niners, in turn, experienced both of those in reverse. The Niners also were not helpless or out of control on the play--although they could not stop the safety, they could have anticipated the play better, brought more pressure, and not allowed as much time to run off the clock (although there was a pretty blatant offensive hold on the play*). The Niners also benefited by getting the ball back (with more than four seconds if they had played it better) and an opportunity to make a counter-play--a run back on the kick, Hail Mary pass, or (as Jim Nantz discussed) the fair-catch kick, had the Ravens punter shanked the free kick. So the second and third features are clearly absent on this play. This looks like just one more example of teams exchanging small costs for small (but, it hopes, slightly greater) benefits.
This calculus would change if the safety occurred on the final play of the game (say, where the play starts with :01 on the clock). The play now contains all three features--there is a far greater cost-benefit imbalance, and the trailing team has no control and will not get the ball back or have the chance to take advantage of the safety. But that does not undermine the intentional safety or require a limiting rule. Any problem there can be remedied by still requiring the team to free kick after the safety, even with no time on the clock, giving the trailing team an opportunity to do something on that play (including the fair-catch-and-free-kick). In other words, treat a safety at the end of the game the same as any other safety. We already some precedent on this. A game cannot end on a defensive penalty. And a team that scores a game-winning touchdown on the final play still must play the point-after, even with no time on the clock.
So another fun example of sports rules in action. Just as last fall's National League Wild Card had everyone talking about the IFR, I am glad this Super Bowl has people talking about the intentional safety. But it further illustrates how just unique the Infield Fly Rule is. and another illustration of what makes the Infield Fly Rule so unique.
* John Hollinger pointed out how smart that hold actually was. If the hold had been called, the result would have been a safety (the typical result of a holding penalty in the end zone), precisely what the Ravens wanted there. Since it wasn't called, it just let the Ravens run more time off the clock.
Roger Goodell and reality
Full disclosure: I am going to watch the game today and I'll enjoy it. But this just defies reality. Yes, there is a "risk" of injury, including concussions and other head injuries, in any sport. But only in football is the very purpose of the game for very large people to run into one another at full speed, resulting in regular and repeated concussive- or sub-concussive-force collisions.
We can debate what should or should not be done about football. But let's not pretend it is not different in degree and in kind from any other sport.
We can debate what should or should not be done about football. But let's not pretend it is not different in degree and in kind from any other sport.
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